On "Mental Events" (1970) and "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" (1963), w/ guest Chris Heath.

When we talk about mental events (e.g. desires) causing physical occurrences (an action to obtain what is desired), are we giving a causal picture in the scientific sense, which would rule out free will? Or are reason-giving and causality just different language games?

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